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
21 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Course Report - Counterinsurgency Program Planning
Course No. 4 (9 December to 20 December 1963)


Course Description

1. Counterinsurgency Program Planning Course No. 4 opened on 9 December with ten students, ran two weeks half-time, and closed on 20 December. There were three officers from WH Division, two from the Office of Training, one from ORR, and one each from FE, HH, AF [REDACTED]



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3. The CIFF was originally scheduled to run three weeks starting on 2 December, full time for the first four days and half-time thereafter. I was notified by long distance telephone (Friday, 29 November) that the Course would be delayed one week and reduced in length by one week. This decision, reportedly made by DTR, ADEF, and DTF/TRO, reflected the belief that additional candidates for the Course would be enrolled during the week of 2 December and the determination that the Course should not be postponed to a new date after the turn of the year.

4. Accordingly, the 70 hours were reduced to 40, a new schedule prepared, the students notified, and the lecturers rescheduled or cancelled. Despite this, the essence of the Course remained, and the course structure was unchanged.

5. The CIFF No. 4 was our second experiment in the training of Station Chiefs, and therein lies its principal significance. As stated in the "FOREWORD" of the Course schedule,

"The Counterinsurgency Program Planning Course is designed for CIA station chiefs posted to the more critical countries, for officers who will occupy such positions as deputy station chief, chief or deputy chief of base, chief of operations at a larger station, and for officers assigned at Headquarters to principal command or staff positions which bear directly on field operations.

"The Course takes up the origins, meaning, and concepts of the National Counterinsurgency Program, the Agency's role in counterinsurgency operations, its experience in paramilitary operations, its position on country teams, and the full range of problems pertaining to the direction of its field stations.

"Emphasis is on the direction of CIA's overseas activities. The analysis of these problems will follow the pattern of the CIA station chief's responsibilities . . ."

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6. In both the longer and shorter forms, the CIPP is organized as follows:

PART I

Introduction

The concepts of Counterinsurgency. The role of State Department in policy making and in interdepartmental coordination. The country team. The roles and missions of AID, USIA, and DOD. (Speakers from the other departments and agencies are scheduled throughout the first week).

PART II

Operation of CIA Stations in the
Less Developed and More Critical Countries

- Section A: Relations with other U.S. Government Representatives
- Section B: Relations with Liaison Contacts
- Section C: The Management of Stations
- Section D: The Direction of Operations
- Section E: Over-all Intelligence and Estimative Reporting

PART III

Military and Paramilitary Operations

Strategy and tactics in guerrilla warfare. DOD and CIA experience and current programs. A demonstration of CIA shelf and developmental devices for PM activity.

PART IV

Review, Seminar, and Conclusion

7. There were five cancellations among guest speakers. [REDACTED] Branch of FE, who had contributed to early to the previous course, was prevented from appearing on two occasions by a sudden TDY. [REDACTED]

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Leonard, Jr. of FBI was unable to represent the Department of Defense. Ray Cline, FBI, could not appear although he had planned to do so. [REDACTED] and now [REDACTED] Staff Chief for WH, was sent off on a field trip during the week he was to appear.

8. Among the substitutes who volunteered to fill the gaps were:


- a. [REDACTED] Chief of the Telecommunications Staff of the Office of Communications, appeared not only when planned, but also at times scheduled for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. His performance was outstanding and most valuable.
- b. [REDACTED] until recently Chief of Station in [REDACTED] substituted for [REDACTED] in "The Management of Stations," and for Ray Cline on "Over-all Intelligence and Estimative Reporting".
- c. Captain Lee Blocker, USN, and Colonel Ryan Moon, USAF, both of FBI, represented DOD on behalf of Colonel Leonard. Their performance was not only poor, but meaningless. Captain Blocker made a halting effort. Colonel Moon never opened his mouth. They will not be invited again.
- d. Although technically not a substitution since his name appeared on the schedule, [REDACTED] came in place of [REDACTED] whom I had originally invited, to tell the story of CIA operations during the crisis in the [REDACTED] who served as DODS to Larry in the [REDACTED] delivered an outstanding presentation.

9. In addition to the DOD presentation there was one other low spot -- Gordon Mattison, Deputy Coordinator of the FBI Seminar, who represented State Department on the opening morning. Although he was very pleasant, his presentation was poor.

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Student Reaction

11. The Seminar on the last morning was devoted to a group critique of course, supplementing by discussion the written critiques submitted by the students. [REDACTED] joined us for this post mortem. The following is a summary of class reaction.

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a. Both objectives were deemed fulfilled (within the time allotted) — the teaching of Counterinsurgency and the training of Station Chiefs. One officer wrote ". . . the most instructive course I have taken with the Agency."

b. The concept of the course was declared "definitely valid." "Such a course for Station Chiefs appears absolutely essential." The twin objectives were found entirely compatible.

c. The quality of content was found "very high," "excellent," "superior."

d. A better understanding was gained of current and future Agency problems and relationships.

e. Various thoughts were expressed on what might be added and eliminated. There was disappointment at missing certain presentations which were cut in compressing the course to two weeks. The group and the Chief Instructor agreed on the weak speakers who should not be tapped in the future. [REDACTED] suggested that we dig even deeper into the problems of Station management. By and large it was agreed that no subject matter should be cut, and that little, therefore, could be added.

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f. There was unanimous endorsement of the emphasis placed on discussion rather than on formal lectures.

g. The course was found of value for many reasons. "It clarified the origins, history, and Washington machinery involved in Counterinsurgency. More particularly, in hearing other OCS's I got some new insights and ideas as to how I might have tackled some problems differently".

h. The general feeling on improving the course was to lengthen it again to three weeks.

i. The group expressed conviction that this training be continued, and that the course probably should be mandatory for senior officers going to the field.

Conclusions

12. Although the loss of 30 hours was unavoidable, it was valuable to learn how much of the substance could be presented in 43% less time. As a result of this exercise in compression, it appears that when the course is returned to its full three weeks it will not be necessary to schedule any afternoon sessions.

13. In my opinion, the restructured CIPP has passed successfully through its experimental phases and has achieved a form which can endure.

14. We should consider offering the CIPP four times a year.

15. There should be not less than nine and ideally not more than 15 participants. For less than nine, top level guests should not be invited. A group larger than 15 jeopardizes the feeling of closeness and informality, and limits the possibility of group discussion.

16. To be effective, the course must be run as a seminar and it should be conducted, if ever possible, in a physical environment appropriate to the seniority of the participants.

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17. The "Counterinsurgency Program Planning" label is unfortunate and rather misleading. To compensate for this language and to set forth more clearly the course's purpose, focus, and content, I have drafted a "Foreword" for the course schedule, a special bulletin to be issued 4 weeks before the course is run, and a new course description for the regular OTR Bulletin.



Chief Instructor

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Attachments:
Schedule
Bibliography

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